The Grenfell Tower fire – an atrocity caused by profit and deregulation



EPSU Firefighters' Network

December 2018



Grenfell Tower fire – summary



- 14 June 2017
- High rise residential building
- 23 floors + basement + roof
- 6 flats per floor
- London Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea
- Nearly 300 people, residents and visitors in the building
- 72 died
- 40 fire engines
- 260 firefighters



The fire

00:54 First call – fire in flat 16, 4th floor

01:08 Fire broke out of the kitchen window of flat 16

01:14 Fire spread vertically in both directions

01:26 Fire reached Level 23 In 12 minutes: fire spread 19 floors to the roof

The architectural crown caused lateral fire spread to the other sides of the building



Firefighting operations

Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA) = 4 fire appliances – first on scene at 00:59

01:21 Flat 16 fire extinguished

Time	People inside	Fire engines	Other	Station manager	Watch manager	Crew manager	Fire- fighter	Total FFs
00:59	286	2			1	2	7	10
01:08	277	4			2	4	14	20
01:26	209	6			3	6	21	30
01:34	160	7	1 Command Unit 1 Turntable Ladder	1	6	8	25	40
01:39	151	10	1 Fire Rescue Unit	2	9	9	41	61

Firefighters' search and rescue

- 02:10 Woman in wheelchair
- 02:19 Woman, girl (7)
- 02:25 Two men, ladder
- 02:26 Woman
- 02:26 Girl (5)
- 02:46 Man, woman, girl (4)
- 02:47 Man, woman, 2 girls (8, 12)
- 03:11 Two women
- 03:21 Woman, two boys (7, 12)
- 03:51 Man, woman, two girls (12, 10)
- 03:52 Woman, girl (12)

3rd floor 9th floor 5th floor 23rd floor 20th floor 14th floor 12th floor 12th floor 12th floor 21st floor 21st floor



04:47	Man, woman,					
	girl (6)	11 th floor				
06:05	Man (57) Blind man (70)	10 th floor				
08:07	Blind man (70))11 th floor				

Causes: fire spread


- The fire started in the kitchen of flat 16 around the area of the tall fridge freezer.
- The fire spread to the external cladding through parts of the internal window surround.
- This led to sustained burning of the cladding either within the cavity or on its external surface, or both.
- The rapid upward vertical fire spread was primarily due to the presence of aluminium composite rainscreen cassettes with polyethylene (PE) filler material.




Causes: the role of cladding



Intense flames shooting up the building




Corner box chimneys



Building failures

- The rainscreen cladding system
- The lining materials around the windows
- Fire resistance of flat fire doors
- Flat fire doors did not self-close
- No help for old or disabled
- A lower standard of stair doors
- Heating system and gas pipes in the stair
- A single stair of 1.04 metres
- Lift override failed
- Dry fire main, instead of a wet riser
- Failure of the lobby smoke control system.




FBU warnings: cladding

"The primary risk therefore of a cladding system is that of providing a vehicle for assisting uncontrolled fire spread up the outer face of the building, with the strong possibility of the fire re-entering the building at higher levels via windows or other unprotected areas in the face of the building. This in turn poses a threat to the life safety of the residents above the fire floor...

"It is for these reasons that we believe that all cladding used on multi-storey buildings over 25 metres in height and the fixing systems should be completely noncombustible."

FBU memorandum, Select Committee on Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs (1999)



Deregulation by Tory governments (1979-97)

Review of Fire Policy


An Examination of the Deploymen of Resources to Combat Fire

Building Regulations 1985

- 300 pages of law reduced to 25 pages
- Approved Document B weak voluntary guidance

"Private inspectors" "Self-compliance"

Deregulation – Cutting Red Tape (1994)



Labour governments (1997-2010)

Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004

- Abolition of the advisory council CFBAC
- Scrapped national standards of fire cover
- Abolition of the inspectorate in England

Regulatory Reform Fire Safety Order 2005

- Scrapped fire certificates
- Risk assessment by owners
- "Light touch" enforcement



More Tory deregulation since 2010

- "Red Tape" challenge cutting regulation
- Questioning of whether a National Framework was needed then threadbare version
- Open Public Services mutuals and privatisation
- Repeal of sections 20 and 21 of the Building Act concerning the exteriors for buildings
- "One-In, Two-Out rule" more attacks on regulation







FBU warnings: enforcement/oversight

"There needs to be clear and strong guidance on the enforcement of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005... to ensure the enforcement activities of fire & rescue authorities are properly carried out... We have significant concerns over the near-ending in some brigades of the fire certification regime...

"In its haste to rid itself of the national committee structure covered by the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council, the Ministry had little or no idea of what it would do to replace the functions that the CFBAC covered".


FBU Memorandum to the House of Commons ODPM: Housing, Planning, Local Government and the Regions Committee, (2006)

Austerity – fire cuts since 2010

Between 2011 and 2015, over 30% of central funding was cut from fire and rescue services.

Planned central funding cut by 20% over the 2016-20 period.


Since 2010, **over 12,000** frontline firefighter jobs have been lost across the UK. This is a 20% of the entire workforce.



FBU warnings: austerity

- It's About Time (2010)
- A Service to be Proud of submission to the comprehensive spending review (2010)
- Don't Squeeze the Fire Service Dry (2012)
- Facing Reality submission to the comprehensive spending review (2013)
- Sounding the Alarm (2014)
- FBU Submission to the comprehensive spending review (2015)
- Fire and Rescue Service Matters bulletins for MPs

Sounding the alarm: *the future of our fire and rescue service*



Grenfell Tower Inquiry

Phase 1: the events on the night

- Witness statements and testimony by firefighters
- Witness statements and testimony by the bereaved, survivors and residents
- Expert reports

Phase 2: why and how the fire happened

- The council and building owners
- Construction firms
- Government ministers

